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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of a collision involving a Studebaker automobile with five passengers therein, and large
tractor and semi-trailer. Defendant was operating the
tractor and semi-trailer, which in the record is referred to
as tractor for the part with the engine, and trailer for the
semi-tailer for brevity. The tractor trailer was proceeding
in a southerly direction on a curve, and the Studebaker was
proceeding in a northerly direction on said curve at the
point of collision. As a result of said collision, Captain
Neeshan, a guest passenger, was killed. He was a service
man survived by a widow and two children. Captain Xenakis was killed; he was the driver, and was survived by an
aged mother and father who looked to him for their sole
support. The minor child of the Neeshan's was killed as
was the minor child of the Lietz's. Connie Lietz was injured in said collision. It was dark when the collision
occurred.
All vehicles approaching the curve going south in the
direction the tractor trailer was traveling were unable to
determine by reason of the curve, which side of the road
vehicles coming from the opposite direction were on. This
statement was made by the driver of the vehicle of the
defendant R553-7. The area involved had been newly
paved, and there was no center strip painted in at the time
of the collision. The tractor and trailer crossed completely
over to the wrong side of the highway, exhibits A, B, C,
D, E, and F. The Studebaker ended on its left hand side
of the highway in the borrow pit, only however, after
having made one complete gyration or tum-around.
The tire marks in the foreground of exhibit F were
not made by the Studebaker. Defendant's own witness,
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Faile so certified under oath as indicated on exhibit 00 and
PP as indicated in the testimony of said defendant's witness R788-14, 793-14, defendant contends otherwise. The
width of the said skid marks which crossed over to the
wrong side from the undisputed evidence were wider than
other marks approaching the scene R290-25, which other
marks were identified as being the width of Studebaker
tire marks and were on the Studebaker's right hand side
two feet to the right of the center R296-19, while said
marks going left as shown in exhibit F were wider and
were made by a car the width of a Mercury (see exhibit 5
showing the width differential). The marks in exhibit F,
claimed by defendant as Studebaker marks and going to
the left or the wrong side did not come up and approach
and stop near the skid marks made by the tractor trailer
in the said area R313-2, so the vehicle making the same
could not have been involved in the collision. Note exhibits
themselves A, B, C, D, E, and F. The entire left-hand side
of the Studebaker was damaged and the right-hand side of
the Studebaker showed no damage insofar as any direct
collision or contact with the tractor trailer is concerned.
The damage sustained by the tractor was entirely on its
right-hand side. The manufacturer furnished def~ndant
operator with a tractor record regulating servicing of said
tractor involved in this collision.
Said tractor record, exhibit EE, page 3, contains the
following:
"When relining brakes always reline both sides
of the axel at the same time."
The same exhibit on the :first blue page thereof shows that
on September 24, 1951, a short time prior to the accident,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11. REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND DIRECTED VERDICT.
12. THE ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CULBERT ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES.

ARGUMENT
1. ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AN
INSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO FAULTY BRAKES CAUSING THE DEFENDANT'S UNIT TO SWERVE TO THE WRONG
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.

Plaintiffs theory was based upon the premis that faulty
brakes caused defendant's unit to swerve to the wrong side
of the highway prior to impact. Plaintiff introduced into
the evidence exhibit EE in which it was shown that the
defendant relined the left-hand side of the tractor only.
This was in direct violation and contrary to printed warnings and instructions in said tractor record, published for
the care and operation of said defendant's tractor involved
in the collision. See said warning, on page 3 of exhibit EE.
The brake expert Littlepage, at R 363-15 indicated he had
observed as many as 150 skid patterns where there had
been unequal braking. He also testiRed that letting the
linings go too long would result in a cam lock, locking the
tires R367-15, and that when this occurs even when the
brake is released, the tires will still be locked and skidding,
R367-22. Whether the cam will or will not lock can be
determined by removing the cover, and making an examination R367-27. The expert testiRed at R370-27 that if the
brakes are not equal on both sides, it will throw the tractor
to one side of the road, throwing it to the side where the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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braking coefficient is the greater. Littlepage tesfied that
he has examined many cam locking skid patterns and upon
examining the skid patterns shown on exhibit A, he indicated that they appeared to be a cam locking skid pattern,
R380-l, and that where one side is relined only, there is a
differential in braking coefficient R381-21, and that where
one side is relined only, the position of the cam on the
roller will vary, causing greater braking coefficient on one
side or the other because of the leverage principal R382-22.
At R383-8, the expert testified that you could not have
equal braking coefficient if you reline one side of the brakes
on the tractor only. The expert Littlepage testified that
he had experienced driving units where the brakes showed
skid patterns like shown in the exhibits and that where
brake marks are laid down as shown in exhibit A that it
will throw the unit to the wrong side of the highway
R385-12, and pull it to the side where the wheels are laying down heaviest skid patterns, see R371-l. The witness
further testified at R391-16 that in his opinion the skid
pattern definitely showed a locked cam on the unit, see
also R407-4, and having in prior testimony indicated what
is necessary to unlock the cam to stop the skid marking,
the witness at R392-8 indicated that it was his opinion that
the collision of the two units is what unlocked the cam.
The jury was entitled to have submitted to them the question of whether or not the negligence as produced by
plaintiff, or faulty brakes caused the unit to swerve to the
wrong side of the highway. Plaintiffs's requested instructions at Rl69 to Rl75 inclusive should have been given by
the court and was mandatory under the law. The undisputed evidence showed a complete locking of the tires on
the left hand side of the tractor and the exhibits all show
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the same. The Sheriff, on cross examination at R617-6 was
asked whether or not he knew what the law was relative
to equal adjustment of brakes on both sides of the vehicle
whereupon the court cried out that the court would instruct the jury on the law. The jury could only infer that
counsel was misrepresenting the law or was deceitful in
this respect, since there was never any pronouncement
from the court concerning equal adjustment of brakes or
that consideration should be given the matter or that there
was any law on the matter. Later also it will be noted that
the court intimated that counsel might be deceitful or even
a stinker.
The following cases require the court to give an instruction which permits the jury to consider the case on
the theory of the parties presentation:
WEBB vs. SNOW

132 P. 2nd 114

102 Utah 435

"Trial Court errored in refusing instructions presenting defendant's theory."
MOMSEN vs. PERRY

140 P. 2nd 772
( 13)

104 Utah 151

"Defendant entitled to have his case submitted to
jury on any theory justified by proper evidence.
Toone case cited
The court failed to properly separate the theories
of the parties, but instead gave general instructions
as being mutual without regard to defendant's
theory. 0 0 "
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MILLER vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC
21 Pac. 2nd 865 82 Utah 46
290
( 5)

u.s.

697

"That a party is entitled to have his case submitted
to a jury on the theory of his evidence as well as
on theory of whole evidence is recognized without
argument. The jury must be instructed on the law
as it is and applicable to the circumstances and
theories as they are presented by the evidence."
MARTINEAU vs. HANSON
155 Pac. 432

( 6)

47 Utah 549

"The court must on request give a charge submitting to the jury defendant's theory."
TOONE vs. O'NEILL CONST.
121 P 10 40 Utah. 265

( 11)

"Party is entitled to have his case submitted to the
Jury upon his theory."
McKINNEY vs. CAPSON
99 Pac. 660 35 Utah 180

( 15)

"A party has the right to have the court instruct the
jury upon the law on every material issue in the
case in support of which there is some evidence."

MORGAN vs. BIGLER STAGE
238 Pac. 160 75 Utah 87
PRATT vs. UTAH LIGHT
169 P 686 57 Utah 7
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Plaintiff had established from plaintifFs witnesses that
relining one side of the brakes on the tractor would give
less friction on the new lining than on the old lining, and
thus make brake coefficient unequal on both sides.
Defendant's witness was asked whether there would
be less friction on the new lining than on the old, at R775-l
when the court cried, without objection, and you don't
need to answer.
This was prejudicied error since he would have been
required to say yes and thus require a directed verdict for
plaintiff on admission of negligence.
Since the legislature required that motor vehicles have
the brakes so adjusted that they will be equal on both sides
of the axle it was mandatory that the court instruct on this
matter, when counsel requests same or calls the court's attention to same and submits evidence thereon.
2. ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE ON THE COURT'S
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND ON THE SINGLE ISSUE OF
WHETHER DEFENDANT DROVE TO THE WRONG SIDE.
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Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the court's instruction No. 4 (Lietz File Vol 2R88) be modified to include the movement of the tractor trailer to the wrong
side which might be caused by faulty brakes R230, and
the theory that defendant's driver must drive the vehicle
to the wrong side to be negligent be deleted. This item,
the court ignored. The jury could well find that the tractor
trailer was never driven to the wrong side of the highway.
In his deposition, the driver indicated that he did not tum
it to the left hand side, and on evidence submitted by plaintiff it was indicated that the vehicle was pulled to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tir
\\']

til

11
wrong side of the highway by the excessive friction on the
left hand side of the tires of the tractor rather than being
driven there. Moreover, a finding that the Studebaker
was on the wrong side, should not preclude guests from
recovery if the tractor was also even partially pulled to the
wrong side prior to impact, even if not driven there, particularly where defendant's negligence in brake care caused
it to swerve to the wrong side, and if this was a contributing
proximate cause of the collision.
3. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
11, 16, 17, 26, 27, SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF. PARTICULARLY 26, AND 27, OR GIVING AN INSTRUCTION THAT BOTH
UNITS COULD BE RIDING THE CENTER LINE AND YET
PERMITTING GUESTS NEESHAN AND LIETZ TO RECOVER.

The court erred in failure to give instruction 1b, R171,
Exhibit EE. The manufacturer caused to be placed in the
tractor record a warning that when relining brakes of said
tractor, both sides of the axle must be relined at the same
time. The evidence before stated indicates that the reason
why the tractor record contains this warning is that it is
impossible to have the brakes so adjusted that they will
operate equally on the opposite sides of the vehicle without compliance with this important warning and instruction contained in said tratcor record relative to the care and
servicing of said vehicle in relining the brakes on both
sides at the same time. Note also this is the only safety
warning in the entire tractor record, since failure to reline
both sides of the tractor, the court not only neglected to
instruct the jury that the laws of Utah 1943 provided:
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57-7-205 (7) (c)
"All brakes shall be maintained in good working
order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as
equally as practicable with respect to the wheels
on the opposite sides of the vehicle."
but also neglected to properly instruct the jury with respect
to the legal effect of an absolute showing that the defendant
had been negligent in this particular respect. One side
of the brakes only was relined in careless disregard of the
published warning and is in not contradicted and even
admitted by defendant's shop foreman at R768-24 and is
a direct violation of the statute above quoted. The authorities hold that failure to comply with a statute with respect
to brakes is negligence per se, see:
170 ALR at 660
Plaintiff· requested a negligence per se instruction, and got
none. The skidmarks and the record is conclusive on the
fact that the braking coefficient was unequal. See skid
marks in all photographs submitted. The expert also testified such practice resulted in unequal adjustment on opposite sides of the vehicle.
The lower court not only ignored all of the above,
but even refused instruction number 2 at R172 advising
the jury that the law required equal adjustment and that
they should consider from the facts whether there was
such equal adjustment, and whether this neglect was a
proximate cause of the collision.
Instruction numbers three and four R174 would have
permitted counsel to have argued that the maintenance
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was negligence in failure to comply with the regulations
in the tractor records, and the law and to have done so
under court sanction as to what the law was.
Under instruction 5 as requested, the matter of
whether or not the defendant had discharged said defendant's duty relative to maintenance of equal adjustment
on both sides of the axle and maintenance in good working order could have been considered and argued to the
jury. This instruction the court ignored, particularly with
respect to whether or not inspections were involved which
would have revealed any of the neglect charged.
Instruction 8 R 178 should have been given as requested since the negligence charged by the plaintiff originated in relining one side of the brakes only, also R368-1
discloses that the mere removing of the plate would have
shown that the cam on one side of the unit was turning
over farther than the cam was on the other side where the
brakes had been newly relined, and that the said inspection if it had been made would have revealed that
greater pressure was being applied on one side than on
the other side R383-11 causing unequal adjustment on opposite sides of the tractor.
Failure to give instruction number 10 R 180 constituted
error since defendant's witness Noyes testified that the
Studebaker flashed its spotlight several times while the
driver paid no attention to the Studebaker until he observed that he was on a curve with no center mark and
150 feet from said Studebaker R at which time he applied
his brakes and there would have been no need for sudden
application of the brakes had the driver been paying attention and slowing down, and the sudden application of
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the brakes, because they were not in equal adjustment is
what caused the unit to swerve to the wrong side of the
road. See also instruction 11 R 181 with respect to sudden
application and resulting swerve.
Instruction 16 R 189 quotes the state law reqmrmg
that the braking efforts on the rear most wheels be applied
at the fastest rate. Counsel for defendant stated that on
defendant's unit they all were applied equally. The jury
was entitled to an instruction on this matter since the
legislature had spoken.
Instruction 17 R 191 requires that the vehicle be in
a safe mechanical condition. Plaintiff under proper instruction could have shown that defendant's unit was not
in a safe mechanical condition.
Instruction 26 R 202 should have been given since
the jury could have found both vehicles to be in the center
of the highway and yet permitted a guest not charged with
negligence of the driver to recover and the jury was entitled to be instructed relative to what would constitute
contributory negligence on the part of the guest. Likewise, instruction No. 27 R 203 should have been given to
the jury so that counsel could have argued the matter of
whether or not the tractor trailer was slightly over the
center line and if it was, and if this caused the collision,
that likewise, even if the Studebaker was slightly over the
center portion of the highway that if the tractor trailer be
partially over the center was a contributory proximate
cause of the accident that the guest would be permitted
to recover.
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4. ERROR IN REFUSAL TO PERMIT GRANT STAPLES
TO TESTIFY.

Grant Staples was an independent witness whose farm
adjoined the area of the collision. Plaintiff had purposely
saved this witness for the last to testify. This witness was
the one in counsel's opinion the jury would most likely be
convinced by. The witness was brought up from Kanosh,
Utah, and while he was so ill that he was confined to his
bed while in Salt Lake City except for the half day that
he came into court. The remarks of the Court R528-12-20,
R529-2-17 in refusing to permit Staples to testify was prejudicial error. Tendering proof would only further agitate
the court, and prejudice counsel before the jury.
5. ERROR IN REQUIREMENT THAT ALL QUESTIONS
TO THE EXPERT HARRIS BE SUMITTED AS HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

Dr. Franklin S. Harris, Jr. qualified as a physicist, and
was at R428-6 qualified in research with respect to movement of vehicles in collision. He was qualified in the field
of mechanics. Dr. Harris also visited the scene of the collision in the case at bar and, examined the skid marks,
and examined the units involved, and made detailed measurements and memoranda with respect to the damage
demonstrated on both units. He also testified that he had
the photographs, exhibits g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and others
with him for comparison at the time he examined the
scene of the accident, and when he was examining the
details with respect to the damage done the respective
units, and was personally present when the white strip was
being painted in the center of the road R433-8. At R435-7,
the doctor was also able to make measurements and deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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termine the precise angle at which the tractor skid marks
intercepted the newly painted center line on the highway.
The expert measured the skid marks and made observations of the jiggling marks of the dual wheels as demonstrated on the highway. The doctor had also made measurements of the small light scratch marks on the Studebaker door, which were uniform in distance between each
other, to determine where the door had engaged the tractor
to imprint such uniform marks thereon, and had determined
that this was made by the right running board of the
tractor which had uniform imprints of the same width
thereon and pressed them on the left door of the Stuebaker.
The doctor also determined where the center of gravity of
the Studebaker was and where the Studebaker came to
rest by the location of the peculiar Y post seen in the exhibit E and its location in relation to the crescent on the
highway. At R437-4, and 440-16, the court without objection from defendant, declared the former questions as
being leading. This was prejudicial error since it prejudiced counsel for plaintiff in the eyes of the jury, it appearing to the jury that counsel was improperly conducting the
examination. Counsel did not lead the witness, or indicate
what the answer should be, he was merely directing his
attention to particular items he had measured particularly
with respect to the pattern on the Studebaker door showing that the door had engaged the running board of the
tractor. Again at R444-10, the court without justification
interrupted counsel when he was merely inviting attention
to the distance between certain areas which is certainly not
a leading question. How can a witness tell what he found
unless his attention is directed to a particular item.
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In the administration of justice, courts should not
interfere with orderly processes of interrogation of a witness, and the courts should by their conduct in the administration of justice give counsel and the jury a feeling
that the court is impartial, and trying to be fair, and should
not make it appear to the jury that counsel is either stupid
or deceitful. At R447-6, the court instructed counsel for
plaintiff that he would not be permitted to ask a question
of the expert unless it was a hypothetical question, see also
829-30. Counsel indicated to the court that where the expert was familiar with facts, he should be entitled to indicate what facts he had under consideration, and give his
opinion as based on the facts he found. Court would not
permit anything other than hypothetical questions, and
would not permit counsel to argue the law on the same
at R455-13. The court pronounced that the expert would
not be permitted to give facts he had observed and placed
counsel· in an embarrasing position to ask further factual
questions. Moreover, at R459-25, the court again without
objection refused to permit counsel to have the expert testify concerning the fact that the tractor had only one wheel
on each side of the front of the vehicle, with two sets of
duals on the rear of the tractor, and the skid marks examined by the expert were made by duals, and there were
no brakes on the front of the tractor. Since the expert
observed that the dual skid marks had a jiggle in the same,
and was of the opinion that this jiggle was produced by
an impact, having measured the angle, knowing the distance from the rear of the tractor to the front of the tractor,
the doctor could have shown the precise position of the
tractor at impact, which would have placed the front of
the tractor completely over on the wrong side of the road.
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Yet the court knew that plaintiff's witnesses were all killed,
and having to rely on an expert, refused to allow the expert
to testify or examination on the subject. It may, in the
court's mind, have been sixth grade arithmetic as stated
at R459-25, but the court overlooks the fact that many
jurors who are not involved in daily processes of mathematical computations may not understand complicated
matters, and may have forgotten geometry and should have
the items explained to them in detail, and counsel should
be entitled to fully present such matters, particularly the
relation of the angle to the position of the tractor on impact.
Again at R469-3, the court without objection from
counsel stopped the expert in the middle of a sentence and
instructed him to confine himself to hypothetical facts, and
how the machine moved according to the law of physics,
and not what he observed relative to skid marks or other
physical facts. At R482-14 counsel with the examination
of the two units along with the expert knew that the left
side of the Studebaker contacted the right side of the
tractor and also lmew that notwithstanding the terrific impact, the right front fender of the Studebaker did not
engage the tractor and the entire front fender of the Studebaker escaped impact and that this must require the impact to be at an angle, also the license plate on the bumper
of the tractor had been actually printed on the Studebaker
at a definite angle. There was a definite scratch on the
bumper of the Studebaker made by the pin in the bumper
of the tractor showing angle of movement as the units engaged each other and it should also be borne in mind that
the center of gravity of the Studebaker was known, and
that the Studebaker rotated on an axis like scissors with
the front bumper of the tractor in a clockwise motion.
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At R483-22 the court would not even permit testimony on
whether the unit would move clockwise. The driver of the
tractor of defendant had claimed that the Studebaker at
no time came from out of the field, and was at all times,
even at point of impact with all four wheels on the pavement R568-l. It is obvious and apparent from the theory
of the defendant that the tracks which were made by the
Mercury could not have been made by the Studebaker
since if the tracks, foreground exhibit F, had been made
by the Studebaker with the impact occuring on the tractor's side of the highway, the Studebaker would of necessity had to have its rear part off on the unpaved part of
the highway to have engaged the tractor at the angle it
was known to have engaged the same. Exhibit F (or any
other exhibit) does not show any skid marks off the highway. While on the other hand if the tractor had been on
:the wrong side, and the Studebaker hit it head on and at
an angle, the angle, rotation, and all facts would have been
consistent with the damage demonstrated. Yet the court
at R483-2 said he didn't see any hypothetical question you
can base that on and on the same page at line 22 another
objection unproperly sustained. Certainly the dotcor should
have been permitted to testify to the fac~s he observed,
and give his opinion on this matter to show that the collision had to be on the Studebaker's right hand side of the
.highway.
Again at R484-14, counsel still attempting to pursue
this matter is stopped by the court, this time, however,
with objection made by counsel for defense. Again at
R485-20, through the next several pages, it will be observed
that the court even refuses to permit testimony when counsel attempts to phrase the same upon hypothetical quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion basis, as to whether the matter would fly forward or
not, the court had no right to stop counsel from giving
expert opinion on the matter. It was important relative to
deposit of debris seen in the exhibits to consider whether
impact at a certain point would be consistent with where
debris was deposited. As a matter of fact the debris seen
in the foreground of the exhibits was entirely interior contents of the Studebaker. The highway patrohnan had observed that had the impact occurred at the crescent these
interior contents could not have come through the floor
board of the car, and would of necessity had been deposited
upon a subsequent gyration some time after impact, and
the expert had made measurements and calculations as to
the precise · place these objects were deposited in such
movement after impact. Yet he was not permitted to express an opinion on this matter, or even indicate what calculations he had made on the same. The skid marks and
the damage to the units told a complete story, and plaintiff was entitled to have this story put before the jury. The
fact that Dr. Harris happened to be an expert should not
have precluded him from the right to tell the jury what
facts he had observed and the court was in error at
R518-24 indicating that counsel could argue to the jury
and show the jury what had happened, and yet pronounce
that it would not be proper for Dr. Harris to demonstrate
his theory to the jury. At Rl58, counsel again pressing the
importance of what slippage there was, if any, between
the two units after impact, and what precise points of the
unts engaged each other, R518-28 in asking the expert to
demonstrate how the crease on the side of the Studebaker
was placed there, and was interrupted by the court without having completed his sentence, and without objection
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from defendant and was not permitted to express an opinion or demonstrate how the damage was accomplished on
the Studebaker. The court further at R519-8 and 20 merely
permitted the expert to give his measurements disclose
relative to damage and which parts of the units engaged
each other. See also R519-18 where the court refused to
permit the expert to show any part of his theory relative
to the angle of engagement or the gyration or scissors
actions of the cars with respect to their respective contacts.
The Studebaker, as shown in exhibit T had tire marks on
the rear of the same. Observe also that this mark is of a
concave nature, or in the form of a crescent, and also observe on the large exhibit of the tractor that the rear dual
has a noticeable scuff mark on the same. It certainly requires an expert to make a determination as to how, under
the facts observed, these respective units engaged each
other, to make such marks yet the court at R520-21 sustained an objection on this very matter. Again at line
17 R 521 the question was again put up, and objection sustained by the court. The court would not even permit
counsel to cite the law counsel had available, relative to
this matter, see:

2 JONES on Evidence 703
The position of the crescent on the highway where the
defendant claimed the accident occurred, was .found by
the doctor to be exactly straight across from the Y post
observed in exhibit M in the smaller ones, and E in the
larger ones. It will be observed that the Y post intercepts
the line of the Studebaker about at the hub on the rear
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wheel. Had the Studebaker therefore advanced forward,
even its length, it would have been impossible for the collision to have occurred by the crescent, since as observed
from the photographs, the Studebaker had advanced only
about three-fourths of a length opposite Y post. Should
the angle of impact have been sufficient to have caused
the Studebaker to strike and rotate rapidly, advancing forward and engaging the side of the tractor as it advanced,
as one gear engages another gear, and then turning around
again it would have been impossible for the collision to
have occurred at the crescent or on the tractor's side of
the highway, and the Studebaker to have stopped at a
distance much shorter than 36 feet north of the crescent.
It is known that the units did engage each other as gears
engage each other from the marks on the respective units
and the tires. The movement of the Studebaker from the
point of impact on the Studebaker's side of the highway
forward, depositing the seats at the point seen in the exhibits and swinging around over against the Y post was
entirely consistent with the measurements and theories
produced by Dr. Harris, yet the court at R483-23, when
the doctor was asked if he had an opinion as to the relative
movement of the respective vehicles, particularly the distance of the Studebaker would likely have traveled forward
after initial impact, the court sustained an objection thereto without counsel for defendant having given a legal
reason for said objection. Please observe in the testimony
of the expert of the defendant that like prejudice was not
demonstrated by the court. The court permitted the expert for defendant to testify to anything and everything,
including the giving of testimony which had been objected
to, and purporting to demonstrating his entire theory.
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6. ERROR IN THE COURT CREATING PREJUDICE TO
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE FOLLOWING:
A.

STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO READING PART
OF NOYES' STATEMENT.

At R748-3 the court stated:
"Go ahead Mr. Schoenhals; I say this to you, (turning to the jury), if either of these lawyers read you
half of a question, you might assume that they are
trying to deceive you. That should be reason enough
to you gentlemen that if you don't read out all of
the question they are going to think you are a
stinker."
R 493-3.

64 CJ 93
"Criticism of counsets conduct of trial - It is error
for the court to comment unfavorably, in the presence of the jury, on the conduct of the trial by
counsel for one of the parties, especially in view
of the fact that counsel in such situation is without
opportunity to resent such criticism without risk to
himself and injury to his client's cause with the
jury."
Chistman vs. Union Ry, Co. of New York City
205 N.Y.S. 594, 210 App. Div. 104
(Rev. 200 N.Y.S. 800, 121 Misc. 247)
See Kluge vs. Northern Pac. Ry Co.
9 P. (2d) 74, 167 Wash. 294
(applying the rule)
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Holding Counsel up to ridicule - The trial judge,
when counsel makes contentions which are not
deemed sound, should overrule them with dignity,
and not use language holding counsel up to
ridicule."
Schafer vs. Thurston Mfg. Co.
137 A. 2, 48 R.I. 244.
An examination of the record well discloses that Noyes,
a hostile and adverse witness was under cross examination. He had given Mr. Summerhays a statement. The
witness was not only under cross examination, but the
statements he had given in writing to Summerhays prior
to the trial were being used to impeach the witness. Mr.
Hanson over objection of counsel for plaintiff was practically leaning on shoulders of counsel in connection with
statements being read. The trial judge in accordance with
the cases above should have given a ruling with dignity
without using language which might hold counsel up for
ridicule before the jury. It is the contention of counsel that
litigants and the parties interested in proceedings in whic~
the negligence causing the death of loved ones is being
adjudicated, should entitle said parties to a ruling of this
appellate court showing them that judicial system does
not sanction unjudicious remarks and that such discussion
has no place in our courts in the administration of justice,
particularly, when the jury might even infer that counsel
is intentionally trying to deceive them, and that he might
even be a "stinker." Such remarks frustrate counsel and
justice, and do not lend dignity to judicial proceedings,
and cause counsel to feel that counsel is being intimidated
by the court against doing his best to make a proper pres-
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entation and is being deterred in preservation of a record.
Such comments on the part of the court can well account
for lack of scientific preservation of the record under objection and continued comments of the like from the court.
The remark speaks for itseH as to whether or not it is prejudicial, and the faith of litigants in unbiased and unprejudiced judges and in our judicial system, should be
restored by this appellate court pronouncing that there is
no place in our courts of justice for such remarks, in the
administration of justice.
B.

COURT RAISING OBJECTION TO ASKING A LEADING QUESTION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF C.
ROBINSON IN ABSENCE OF OBJECTION FROM
COUNSEL.

R362-6 Counsel for plaintiff was asking the Sheriff a
question on cross examination as to whether or not the
Sheriff knew that the state law required brakes to be in
equal adjustment on both sides of the vehicle. The court
did not even permit counsel to complete his question when
the court cried out:
"Well now let me tell the jury what the law is and
let's not be telling them by inference here. If we
need any law told to the jury, I will explain that
to them so you don't have to bother the Sheriff
about it."
Counsel carries much responsibility in determing the
future financial support of minors of a deceased service man
with several deaths being involved and when the court
without objection and in an angry voice interrupts counsel,
and will not permit counsel to cross examine, particularly
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when counsel could have taken exhibit EE and shown the
Sheriff that the tractor record EE was on the tractor at
the time of the collision and had he opened and read the
same, that a violation of the would have been apparent,
counsel appeals to the higher court in the interest of the
justice to hold such action by the court as being prejudicial
error. This should particularly be held as being prejudicial
error in view of the fact that the jury was informed by
the court that certain conduct would entitle them to infer
that counsel was trying to deceive them and that they
might think counsel was a "stinker," and the court then
tells the jury that the Sheriff will not be permitted to be
examined on this, and that if there is any law that needs
to be told the jury that the court will explain, and tell
them. The jury could well infer from this statement that
counsel actually was trying to deceive them, since the court
neglected to instruct the jury that there was any law in
the State of Utah requiring the brakes to be in equal adjustment and being silent on this item the jury would of
necessity have to infer that counsel was deceitful in this
respect and was attempting to misrepresent to them what
the law was.·
When counsel is on tension in a strenuous law suit
involving the entire financial future of many people and
bears the responsibility of presenting to the best of his
ability the facts to the jury, the tedious strain is such in
the interest of justice and proper consideration to the
nervous excitement of counsel, and the opinion of litigants
and jurors of our judicial system that the courts should
be most cautious and considerate of litigants and counsel
and avoid any statements from which prejudice, anger, or
frustration of the Administration of justice might be caused.
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7. ERROR IN REQUIRING THE JURY TO CARRY ON
UNTIL ABOUT 10:00 O'CLOCK P.M. WITH THE CASE.

At about 4:00p.m. on Thursday, the court announced
that he would not grant an additional day for the trial
of the case R228. No pronouncement had been given prior
to that time that the time of trial would be shortened and
that plaintiff would not be permitted the right to put on
rebuttal and particularly that plaintiff would not be permitted to have Dr. Freeman from Fillmore, Utah, appear
and testify on Friday. Counsel for plaintiff had called the
doctor long distance the day before, and the doctor had
agreed to £y up Friday morning in his own private aircraft
to appear as witness. The court was familiar with this fact
R228. From a careful survey of the witnesses to testify,
the material necessary to be placed before the jury, counsel
for plaintiff had determined that this was the earliest time
he could have the doctor present to testify. It was apparent to counsel that the evidence to be submitted would
consume the entire day Thursday and that rebuttal would
go forward Friday, which would have been the fact had
the court not insisted on an evening session. Counsel therefore was acting in good faith in requesting the doctor to
fly up Friday morning, and recognizing the fact that the
doctor was the only doctor in the city of Fillmore in connection with the hospital, and in the public interest felt
that it would be unwise to have him come up and sit all
day Thursday to appear on Friday. The entire theory of
the case of the defendant and the entire defense of the
defendant's was that the marks in the foreground of exhibit F were made by the Studebaker, going over to the
wrong side. This was not only denied by Faile, who signed
affidavits on photographs to the contrary, but also by Dr.
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Freeman who was standing near the bodies and in a position where he actually observed these marks being laid
down by a Mercury. It was not proper for plaintiff to
place Dr. Freeman on in the evidence in plaintiffs case
in main. It would have been properly objectionable as
anticipating the theory and defense of defendant's case.
Yet the court refused to grant one day's time or to give
plaintiff time necessary in which plaintiff could present an
eye witness to the laying down of tracks in exhibit F as
being made by the Mercury, rather than the Studebaker.
This was most important and constituted prejudicial error.
It is also very objectionable to make it appear to the

jury that they were required to take supper and return
and stay until 10:00 p.m. in the evening listening to the
trial when it appears ~s though it was the plaintiff's fault
for their being retained, and particularly when one of the
lady juror's had announced that she had a friend in Utah
from out of the state and she was most anxious to spend
the evening visiting with said friend. In a case so involved
as this, plaintiff should have been granted at least an hour
to sum up the evidence and present the case, and in the
fixing of time, such a request at such a late hour would
have infuriated the jury and would have been prejudicial
to the case of the plaintiff, particularly where the jury was
required to stay late into the evening. The grandfather of
one of the children killed in the accident knew a court
was in session where the litigants were given over thirty
days time in the trial over issues as to which was going
to prevail, .where millions of dollars were concerned and
all parties wealthy. It is most difficult for counsel to explain to the widow and orphans of a service man why
the court would not grant just one more additional day
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for trial of their case and yet would extend to other people a full thirty days of the court's time.
8. PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF COUNSEL FOR DE.
FENDANT IN CLOSING "DRIVER CHARGED WITH THE
DEATHS OF PARTIES INVOLVED."

Counsel for the defendant insisted that the driver,
Laren Somsen, sit through the entire trial notwithstanding
the fact that plaintiff had invoked Rule 43 F, which should
have excluded said driver. There was not only error in
this respect, but when counsel for the defendant was
summing up his case to the jury he extended his hand to
the driver sitting in the presence of the jury with a long
sad forlorn looking face and told the jury that plaintiff
had charged the driver with the responsibility of the death
of the people involved. This was highly prejudicial and
should have been grounds for a mistrial. It was also a
mis-statement of the theory of plaintiff's case, since plaintiff had contended that the relining of one side of the
brakes was to be considered in negligence which caused
the vehicle to swerve over to the wrong side. Under the
instructions given by the court, the jury could not help
but be sympathetic to this sad looking driver when the
judge had instructed the defendant, not the driver, could
only be found negligent if the driver drove to the wrong
side. The court having refused to instruct the jury on the
negligence with respect to the relining of the brakes required the jury to come in with a verdict in favor of the
defendant in absence of proof that said driver negligently
drove to the wrong side. The jury could not even consider
negligence of the driver in suddent application of brakes
as being a factor. Moreover, plaintiff had tried this case
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in the absence of the sympathetic widow and orphans without any of them appearing to generate sympathy and then
counsel for the defendant notwithstanding the fact that
counsel for plaintiff had confined the trial strictly to the
facts without the introduction of the sympathy angle or
prejudice, struck a deliberate blow below the belt by
making it appear to the jury that the driver was charged
with something. The jury could anticipate jail or other
difficulties when as a matter of fact the driver was not even
made a party defendant. Fair play on the part of the court
should have at least granted plaintiff a new trial under such
unfair statements made by counsel for defendant.
9. COURT REFUSING TO EXCLUDE LAREN SOMSEN,
THE DRIVER, AFTER PLAINTIFF HAD INVOKED RULE 43 F.

The court erred in refusing to exclude the driver Laren
Somsen under Rule 43F particularly when the court ruled
that the Rule 43F havirig been invoked required all of
plaintiff's witnesses to remain outside of the court room.
Somsen was not a party to the suit, he was the driver of
the car, and was kept in the court room for the sole purpose of generating sympathy on the part of the jury. The
defendant likewise had their officers in court, said officers
sitting with the counsel for defendant. Plaintiff had no
one sitting with counsel and all of plaintiff's witnesses were
excluded.
10. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL AND PERMIT DR. FREEMAN TO TESTIFY ON FRIDAY TO SHOW HORACE CLARK WAS THE FIRST MERCURY
DRIVER, AND NOT THE MERCURY DRIVER UNDER DISCUSSION AND TO BRING IN HAL NOYES, MR. FAILE, AND
MR. TALBOT TO SHOW THE SAME.
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The court erred in refusing to give one additional day
trial which would have permitted plaintiff to proceed on
rebuttal and show that the skid marks upon which defendant had relied as being made by the Studebaker foreground exhibit F, were not made by the Studebaker and
were actually made by a Mercury coming to the scene
skidding and up close to it leaving tire marks in an attempt to stop. There was definite evidence that the Mercury came close, and made skid marks, and the marks in
exhibit F shows only 1 set of skid marks where are the
Studebaker tire marks, except on the right side of the road.
The trial judge could have and should have granted a
new trial. This is particularly important since the affiidavit
in the motion for new trial R228 et seq which was not
denied, appropriately called this. to the court's attention.
Moreover, counsel for defendant intentionally pulled a surprise witness by requesting that Hal Noyes, Talbot, be excused before the witness Clark was called to testify. Clark
drove a Mecury car up to the scene and counsel for defendant as well as the witnesses who were at the scene
of the accident all knew that Clark was not the Mercury
driver who laid down the tracks shown in exhibit F as
b~ing under consideration in this cause. Counsel for plaintiff should have been granted leave to have a new trial
or at least have the opportunity to have had the matter
heard on Friday permitting Dr. Freeman, Faile, Noyes, and
Talbot to appear before the court and give testimony to
the fact that the Mercury driver Clark was driving a different colored Mercury and was not the Mercury driver
that slapped on his brakes and laid down tracks shown
in exhibit F.
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11. REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND DI.
RECTED VERDICT.

Appellant established by the evidence the fact that
defendant was negligent in relining only one side of the
brakes of the tractor. The appellant likewise established
the fact that this negligence caused the tractor to swerve
to the wrong side of the highway. These facts were never
refuted, since the tratcor did go to the wrong side of the
highway, and the driver claims that he did not tum it
that way. The appellant likewise showed that the tracks
of the Studebaker where they approached and stopped
abruptly at the point of contact with the tractor skid
marks, placed the Studebaker on the right hand side of
the highway at point of impact R. Counsel recognizes the
fact defendant claims there is some evidence submitted by
the defendant which would tend to indicate that the marks
in the foreground of exhibit F were made by the Studebaker, however, under the maxim of the laws which states
that "the case of a party is not stronger than it is left at its
weakest point on cross examination." And since the defendant is required to admit as testified to by Mr. Faile
their own witness that the marks on which defendant had
relied were not made by the Studebaker, but were aqtually
made by a Mercury car; the court should have instructed
the jury that under the evidence submitted, the negligence
of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision
and for them to assess damage, since there could be no
contributory negligence on the part of a guest under the
evidence submitted, and would have left only the question
as to whether or not the driver Zenakis was guilty of contributory negligence for the jury to consider.
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The authorities uniformly hold that a party to an
action may not cross examine said parties own witness.
70 CJ 615 article 781
58 AM JUR 342 article 618
Mr. Faile testified that the marks in the foreground of
exhibit F were not made by the Studebaker and were
made by the Mercury, see exhibits 00 and PP. The testimony must stand as submitted, and the court erred in
permitting counsel for defendant to cross examine their
own witness over objections of counsel for appellant. Moreover, the authorities likewise hold that a party may not
impeach said witness, and Mr. Faile having given evidence
which exploded the entire theory of defendant's case, an
attempt on the part of the defendant to impeach his own
witness as given was error and the court should have sustained the objection thereto. See:
5 AM JUR 437 Article 792 et seq
Faile testified he saw the Mercury right where the skid
marks in question were made R788-28. Faile, after using
his best judgment and stating that the marks defendant
claims were made by the Studebaker were actually made
by the Mercury, was under redirect examination. See
R793-19 where Faile stated that E. L. Schoenhals did not
tell said Faile that certain marks were Mercury marks, but
asked him to use his judgment in selecting same. The fact
is established that Faile voluntarily and with his best judgment declared the tire marks to be Mercury marks in exhibits 00 and PP. Moreover, it will be observed that this
witness was not related to the plaintiffs and cannot be
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placed in the category of the exceptions with respect to
impeachment of one's own witness. The record discloses
that the defendant's witness Faile had made the selection
of the marks being made by the Mercury at his own leisure
R788-14 and had identified the same in his sworn written
statement. By producing him, plaintiff had vouched for
his credibility and should not be permitted to attack or
to attempt to change his testimony in order to make it
consistent with defendant's theory, and defendant was
bound by his testimony. The authorities likewise hold that
the law should not permit counsel to use this as a means
of coercing his witness in order to change his mind on a
subject where he has made voluntary disclosures. It was
apparent from the record that the witness Faile belonged
to the brotherhood of truck drivers, that he was friendly
to the truck driver, and that he was adverse to the plaintiffs
in the case. Mter said Faile had of his own election and
using his best judgment described the tracks upon which
defendant had relied as not being actually made by the
Studebaker as being made by the Mercury while he was
present and saw them laid down R788-28, the lower court
erred in permitting counsel for defendant to cross examine
and impeach this witness over objection and asking him
leading questions and tricking him to line his testimony up
again in a consistent manner, friendly to the truck driver
of the defendant.
At least the lower court should have recognized the
requested instruction submitted as lB and have permitted
the jury to determine only whether or not the negligence
in failure to reline brakes on both sides and sudden application was the proximate cause of the collision.
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12. THE ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CULBERT ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES.

When counsel for appellant was proceeding in trial
from the items indicated above, it was quite· apparent that
the court making it most difficult for counsel for appellant,
in raising objection on the court's own motion, without
objection from opposing counsel and intederring with the
normal procedure relative to normal cross examination and
ruling against counsel for appellant on items upon which
counsel for appellant now urges to be prejudicial error,
and without even giving counsel an opportunity to argue
the law or complete his question or inform counsel concerning the basis of a ruling. At 611-18 the sheriff was
asked whether the law required brakes to be in equal adjustment, and objections thereto in error sustained. Counsel for appellant should have been permitted to ask the
Sheriff what he observed with respect to the skid marks
all being made by one side of the tractor R611-18, and
what he observed with respect to the skuffing marks on
the tires. Counsel again asked the Sheriff, Mr. Robinson,
if he was familiar with the law requiring brakes to be in
equal adjustment both sides of the vehicle R617-6, counsel
asks the indulgence and patience of this court and requests
that some recognition be given to a situation where the
court cries out an interruption before a sentence is even
completed and further frustrates counsel, so that counsel
is in no mental condition to make a scientific pedect
record when no legal reason is given for the objection
counsel is unable to frame another question that will not
be objectionable. The situation should not require counsel
to keep pressing the court and making it appear to the
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jury that counsel is quarreling with the court. Moreover,
where the court appears already prejudiced and angry,
counsel could well assume that the continued pressing of
items might result in further reprisals and vindicitive action
on the part of the court to the prejudice of counsels clients,
counsel respectfully requests that this court take notice of
these factors in declaring as error the unrequested objection volunteered by the court with respect to the evidence
of the Sheriff Culbert Robinson.
With respect to the evidence of Hal Noyes, this witness testified that he saw the Studebaker on the wrong side
of the highway. He also testified that the Studebaker approached the scene striking the tractor with the right front
fender of the Studebaker and bounced to the Studebaker's
left hand side without becoming involved in any further
collision with the tractor or the trailer, and without turnin around and made such statements under oath prior to
the time said Noyes appeared in court. Counsel for appellant took this witness down to the wrecking yard where
the Studebaker was taken, immediately after the accident,
and had there the pictures of the scene and Studebaker
and tractor which are now displayed to this appellate court
as exhibits. The witness Noyes examined the pictures,
examined the wrecked Studebaker and also examined a
tractor which was near the Studebaker, which tractor was
the same type as was involved in this collision. Counsel
for appellant asked Noyes to examine the pictures and
determine whether or not the pictures reflected with fidelity
the damage and scene as he remembered it, to which he
replied "yes." Noyes then examined a crease in the door
of the Studebaker and measured the distance of the said
crease in the door from the ground with his leg against
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the door of the Studebaker holding his hand on his leg
where the crease in the Studebaker door was made. He
then walked over to the tractor again measuring the height
of the running board on the tractor on his leg from the
ground. Noyes admitted to counsel for appellant that it
appeared as though the Studebaker under closer scrutiny
struck with the left fender rather than the right fender,
and that it was apparent that after striking the tractor
that the Studebaker made a complete turn around engaging the tractor's right hand running board against the
left hand door on the Studebaker and then swerving around
again and that it also appeared as though the Studebaker
could have been facing forward again striking the rear
duals of the trailer only, after having made a complete
tum around or one complete revolution. The witness Noyes
indicated that he did not observe any of this gyration and
could not believe that it happened until he had convinced
himself by making the observations which he made at the
wrecking yard, and that he knew for certain he was now
mistaken on what he thought he had observed. The witness Noyes also could have made his observations of the
Studebaker being on the wrong side after it had impacted
on the right side of the road, and made a complete revolution, and had advanced 36 feet, which is double its length,
and on its last impact with the trailer appeared at the
point to said Noyes, to have been on the wrong side of the
highway, and this would be the only time that Noyes could
have seen the Studebaker since he was only 50 feet behind
the trailer. The court should bear in mind it was dark.
It was most important to appellant's case that these items
be permitted to be admitted into the evidence on the cross
examination of Noyes, yet the trial judge erroneously at
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R756-15 stopped counsel from cross exammmg Noyes on
this very vital detail, and again at R756 refused to permit
counsel on cross examination to bring out the fact that
things happened at the scene of the accident which Noyes
did not observe and which upon closer scrutiny he was
convinced did actually occur. The right of cross examination has never been so curtailed or refused to counsel's
knowledge.
The following authorities support counsel in holding
that the rights of cross examination should not be interferred with by the court and that great latitude should
be extended counsel.
70

CJ 611

"A party has a right to cross examine witnesses
who have testified for the adverse party, and his
right is absolute, and not a mere privilege.
~ ~ ~ It is not within the discretion of the court to
say whether or not the right will be accorded."

70

CJ

615

"The right to cross-examine witnesses of the adverse
party being absolute 76 it should not be abridged
77."
Citing Utah case.

58 AM. JUR. 340
These cases should require a complete reversal of the
abuse of the lower court in refusing counsel the time
honored, privilege of cross examining adverse witnesses.
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SUMMARY
In this action two service men were killed. While
their dependents were burying their dead with no person
interested in protecting their rights, not even the Sheriff,
and with all the witnesses in plaintiff's car killed with the
exception of one who was asleep and seriously injured, it
must be apparent to this appellate court that it was only
under laborious petition that counsel was able by court
order to go into the records and bring before the court
disclosure of the negligence of the defendant in failure to
maintain brakes in such condition that the said brakes could
be applied equally on both sides, and when suddenly applied would cause the unit to swerve to the wrong side of
the highway. Had it not been for the pictures taken, and
the work of counsel looking into these issues, and in reviewing records that had been produced under court order,
none of these details would have been available. It is very
discouraging to counsel after having worked for months
examining records, interviewing experts, and going through
evidence which discloses conclusive evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant as well as conclusive evidence
that such negligence in relining brakes on one side only
would cause the vehicle to be on the wrong side of the
highway at impact, to have the court completely ignore
this most important theory as well as the many requests
prepared and submitted thereon in the thirty instructions
submitted. Our juries always give considerable weight to
pronouncement from the bench concerning what the law
is. Since the jury was instructed, "You are not to consider
as evidence any statement of counsel made during trial,"
the failure on the part of the court to give judicial sanction
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to the law or any legal recognition to the theory of the
Plaintiff, or any instructions upon which plaintiff might
have argued under judicial sanction with respect to plaintiff's theory was prejudicial error. Moreover, with the increasing number of deaths on the highways, practices indulged in by large trucking companies which are contrary to the published manual of instructions of the manufacturer of said tractors particularly when the brake expert testified that such negligence on the part of the trucking company is the very cause of the unit going over the
center line, such flagrant violations of safety warnings
should be discouraged by our courts. If trucking companies
can indulge in such practices resulting in property damage
and death, particularly where they are running units on
our highways the maximum width permitted under our
law, where even an inch or two on the wrong side of the
highway might mean death, and then receive judicial approval, of such conduct without even a mention by our
court that such conduct might constitute negligence, it is
apparent that such action by our courts is prejudicial to
maintenance of safety standards as well as the rights of
parties and orphans deprived of future support through
such flagrant disregard of rights of life and property. The
law should be quick to recognize established negligence
particularly where the death of a service man forced to
be away from their families and who are forced to use the
road more than normally, are concerned. The Civil
Aeronautics Board always makes an investigation to determine the cause of aircraft accidents, yet we have the death
of four people involved, and a case where the Sheriff or
highway patrol did not even measure the length of the
skid marks, or make any note of the fact that the skid
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marks were all on one side, or check the tractor record
to find out whether or not the defendant had discharged
his duty with respect to keeping the brakes in equal adjustment on both sides of the tractor when it was obvious
and apparent the brakes were not in equal adjustment from
the skid marks or whether the skid marks crossing over
were the width of the Studebaker guage. Then we have
the court, after counsel has been diligent in presenting
such fact, not only disregarding the law and the facts involved, but also scolding counsel for attempting to find
out why the Sheriff was so negligent in this respect.
May it please this court to entertain a ruling that from
the showing made that it was negligence per se for the
defendant to be so grossly negligent in disregarding the
published warning given in the tractor record, and that
since the collision involved vehicles approaching each
other from opposite directions, that the question of which
unit was on the wrong side of the highway would be
most important, and that this would constitute the proximate cause of the damage sustained. Counsel sincerely believes that the showing of failure to reline both sides, together with the statement of the expert, that this would
cause the unit to swerve to one side or the other, supports
the contention that such neglect and failure was negligence
per se.
The court should have at least given the requested
instructions that this would constitute negligence, and that
the jury had only one problem to determine, and that was
whether or not this negligence was the proximate cause
of the accident. Moreover, both the tractor and the Studebaker could have both been traveling in the center of the
highway, and Neeshan and Lietz recover as guests, and
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they must necessarily so recover as guests since the defendant showed no evidence of contributory negligence on
the part of said guests. True, no recover could be had in
behalf of Xenakis should the jury find that Xenakis was
driving down the center of the highway at the time of
the collision, however, no instruction was given permitting
the guest to recover under such circumstances, which was
error on the part of the lower court.
Counsel should be permitted to try his case without
undue interference from the court with respect to whether
or not a witness should be permitted .to testify. The judge
in the administration of justice should not determine the
quantum of evidence to be submitted. The court should
not place counsel in a position where counsel appears to
the jury to be improperly proceeding, or making it apparent to the jury that counsel is unnecessarily detaining
them for a period longer than the court thinks necessary
by having the witness Staples from Kanosh questioned on
details on which some testimony had been theretofore
given. This is particularly true where counsel feels that a
particular witness might· impress the jury with his sincerity,
his candor, and his firm appraisal of the items he observed.
Plaintiff established the case in main on the pictures
and testimony of experts, together with the records of the
defendant. This being the case, counsel for plaintiff should
not be punished for having exercised deligence in having
the expert review the scene, make measurements, and acquire facts, as a matter of fact, more facts than the Sheriff
and highway patrolman had to exhibit to the jury with
respect to the facts of the area involved and all other facts
including the very angle at which the skid marks of the
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tractor intercepted the center line on the highway as it
was being painted in, together with the angle of the units
as they collided from the facts observed. When counsel
is cautioned that all questions under circumstances of this
type must be made as hypothetical questions, and when
it has been demonstrated in the presence of the jury that
the court questions the propiety of such evidence counsel
should not be required to continue to tender answers and
have the court sustain objection thereto, or the court on
its own motion object thereto without counsel knowing
the basis of the objection, and thus making it appear to
the jury that counsel is attempting to proceed improperly.
When counsel is faced with the burden, under such strain,
of carrying the burden of proof, the court in refusing to
permit argument on the questions of whether or not the
expert could give an opinion based upon the facts he observed after having related the facts is certainly prejudicial
error. Moreover, the conduct of the trial judge in suggesting objection and objecting himself, and sustaining objections in error was prejudicial error. It is certainly prejudicial error to have the court preclude the expert from
showing the movement of vehicles after collision, and
whether or not the Studebaker could have struck at the
crescent and still come to a stop at the point it was known
to have come to rest. This is most important since it is
obvious that had the collision occurred at the crescent
where claimed by the defendant, that the Studebaker advanced the length of said Studebaker in engaging the left
hand door of the Studebaker against the right running
board of the tractor, which would have placed it down
the road 18 feet, and that it would have advanced another
18 feet in turning around to strike the rear dual of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
trailer. Also, knowing the center of gravity of the Studebaker, the axis on which the Studebaker was gyrating on
and the respective jiggles in the tire marks, the expert, from
the fact he had observed was in a position to show the
relative movements of these vehicles after collision and to
show that it was impossible for the collision to have occurred at the crescent on the tractor's side of the highway
and yet have the Studebaker come to rest at the position
shown as Y post where the pictures showed it came to
rest since this was at a point directly across from the
crescent which would mean that the Studebaker did not
advance more than half its length forward after impact.
Moreover, the court erred in refusing to permit the expert to indicate what, in his opinion, made the crescent,
notwithstanding the fact that he had observed the units
as well as the skid marks and the damaged parts on the
respective units and compared them all with the pictures.
It was admitted at Rl00-14 that the trailer tire went flat.
The expert and Noyes both knew from the examination
of exhibit C that the rear duals on the tractor were scuffed,
and knew from exhibit T as well as examination of the
Studebaker that the concave tire marks on the back of the
Studebaker were made by engaging the rear duals of the
tractor, yet the expert was ·not permitted to testify on such
matters, give an opinion, or even answer inquiries on
hypothetical questions with respect thereto.
The record does not disclose any conduct on the part
of counsel for plaintiff of antagonism towards the court,
or any justification for the court to tell the jury that they
might assume counsel was trying to deceive them, or that
they could think that counsel was a "stinker." Where
hostile witness who are mistaken, and have admitted to
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counsel that they are mistaken, and yet attempt to maintain a false position, that they have taken to satisfy their
own ego in maintenance of consistency, counsel should be
granted great latitude in cross examining them on their
statements without having the court make pronouncements
calculated to frighten counsel from pursuing such cross
examination, and making it appear to the jury that counsel
might be deceitful in attempting any such procedure. Such
remarks are not only highly prejudicial, but can frustrate
justice and frustrate professional skill, wisdom, and judgment, and can frustrate not only counsel, but the administration of justice. Such pronouncements should be declared by the appellate court to be most unjudicious and
inappropriate, and not in the interest of the administration
of justice.
Thad Hatch, a party in this litigation was familiar with
the facts that Judge Larsen's court was involved in a trial
lasting more than thirty days. Counsel for plaintiff is unable to explain why one more day could not be granted
for this case to have Dr. Freeman testify, and to have put
on rebuttal, and why the court should insist on the matter
being carried through to completion into the late evening,
without giving warning of the same until after 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of the last day that counsel would be permitted sufficient time to submit the evidence, particularly
where counsel had accommodated the court in the consolidation, and had accommodated the court on stipulations almost to the point of prejudice all in the interest of
time. It was most certainly prejudicial error to continue
proceeding with the trial without leave of having one more
day, and was an abuse of discretion on the part of the
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court to insist that counsel proceed without leave of producing Dr. Freeman.
Plaintiffs did not parade the sympathy angle before
the jury of the orphans and the widow, and the aged
parents, and were they excluded from the court and not
permitted to testify. Counsel assumed counsel for defendant would be fair and that counsel for defendant
should at least under the usual professional practices expected, not indulge in petty prejudices and parade the
sympathy angle of the driver before the jury, and then in
the final summation to the jury, point to the driver as
being charged with the responsibility of the deaths, causing the jury to cringe with sympathy for the driver. Fair
play would dictate the granting of a new trial for such
conduct.
The court actually excluded the witnesses for plaintiff, and all the parties for plaintiff, yet they permitted this
driver, Laren Somsen, to remain for the entire trial.
The trucking company, with its vast enterprises was
able to correspond and locate a second Mercury driver
who appeared at the scene, who was not the one to skid
and run tracks up to and near the scene of the wreck
While under our standards of procedure, counsel might
get by withholding of this witness until they had intentionally requested all other witnesses who were present
when this Mercury approached, to be excused, and all the
time knowing that Mr. Clark was not the Mercury driver
who made the tire marks in question. Most certainly the
court was in error in not permitting a new trial and recalling Talbot, Noyes, and Faile to show that Clark's Mercury did not make the tracks shown in exhibit F and that
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there was actually another Mercury at tbe scene. Moreover, Dr. Freeman would have shown conclusively that the
Mercury did make the marks in question. The jury could
well assume that the entire theory of plaintiff's case was
void since Clark's Mercury did not make any tracks, and
that under the law of averages, it was most unlikely that
two Mercury cars would appear at the scene of the accident immediately after the accident, and one lay down
tire marks, and another appear and make no marks. This
actually did occur and these witnesses as well as Dr. Freeman would have so indicated, had the plaintiff been given
an opportunity to try the case on Friday. In the interest
of administration of justice a new trial should be granted
with instructions that from the proof submitted all plaintiff's requested instructions should have been given, together with a reversal on all points submitted.
Respectfully submitted,

E. L. SCHOENHALS
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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